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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
G .. :\ \~L.:\XD, a l~tah Corporation, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
~L\LT LAKE ·COl~:KTY, STATE OF 
UT~\l-l; Li\.1\lO~r:r B. GUNDERSI~X, 
ED\VIN Q. CANNON, SR., and 
\YlLLL:\).1 G. LARSON, Individually 
and as members of the Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, Appellants. 
Case Xo. 
9280 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STA'rE).II~~N'r OF F.A.CTS 
This i~ an action, filed :Jlarch 18, 1960, in the 'l1hird 
District Court, brought by Gayland, a l~tah Corpora-
tion, against Salt Lake County and individual commis-
sioners for a declaratory judg1nent declaring Title 8 
of the Sa It Lake ( j oun ty Ordinance unla ''rful, illegal and 
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of no force and effect, or for an order directing the 
mernbers of the Board of County Commissioners of Salt 
Lake County to appove the zoning amendment designed 
to effectuate a change in zoning classification of the 
property at 1300 East and 5600 South from Residential 
R-2 to Commercial C-2. A recommendation for said 
charge had previously been denied by the District Zon-
ing Committee and had been approved by the Planning 
Commission. The Salt Lake County Commission denied 
the proposed amendment by a 2-1 vote on May 14, 1960. 
The trial court ruled that Salt Lake County had 
failed to establish a master plan but found that the evi-
dence submitted does not establish that such failure 
prejudiced the substantial rights of the Plaintiff. 
The court determined, however that the Board of 
County Commissioners should have approved and adop-
ted the amendment to the zoning ordinance of Salt Lake 
County and directed said con1missioners to approve and 
adopt said amendment. 
Under date of .~..t\..pril 26, 1960, over the signature 
of Ray Van Cott Jr., Judge of the District Court, a 
Decree was issued ordering that the individual defend-
ants above named as 1nembers of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, l~tah be and they 
\\Tere thereby required and directed to forthwith approve 
and adopt an an1endn1ent to the zoning ordinances of 
Salt Lake County, State of lTtah as recom1nended by 
the Salt Lake County Planning Co1nmission rezoning 
from zoning elassification Residential R-2 to Co1nrnercial 
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C-:2 the follo\\·ing dPseribed traet of land in Salt Lake 
Uounty, State of L~tah, to \Yit: 
''Beginning at the point of intersection of the 
center lines of 5600 South and 1300 East street; 
thence North follo,ving along the center line of 
1300 East street 813 feet; thenee West parallel 
to 5600 ~outh street 650 feet; thence South para-
llel to 1300 East street to the center line of 
5600 South street; thence East following along 
the center line of last said street to the point of 
beginning. All above described property located 
in Section 17, To\vnship 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and ~Ieridian, containing ap-
proxinlately 10 acres. 
HrrATE~IENT OF POINrrs 
POIN1T I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ISSUING 
ITS ORDER SINCE IT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ORDER 
THE BOARD OF COUN'TY COl\1MISSIONERS TO PERFORM 
A LEGISLATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY ACT. 
POINT II. 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, IN AMEND-
ING OR REFUSING TO AMEND ITS ORDINANCES, ACTS 
IN A LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY AND AS SUCH THE MO-
TIVES PROMPTING ITS ACTION CANNOT BE INQUIRED 
IN'TO. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, THEREFORE, IN HAV-
ING MAKE FINDINGS UPON SAID MOTIVES AND BASING 
ITS DECISION THEREON. 
POINT III. 
THE DENIAL BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY CO:'.IMIS-
SIONERS TO ADOPT THE ZONING AMENDMEN'T WAS 
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NOT AN ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE ACT, NOR 
WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THERE IS NO EVI-
DENCE DENYING THE REASONABLE EXERCISE O·F THE 
POLICE POWER ON THE PART OF THE COUNTY COM-
MISSIONERS. 
ARGUl\fEl\rr 
POIN1T I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMl\tiiTTED ERROR IN ISSUING 
ITS ORDER SINCE IT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ORDER 
THE BOARD OF COUN1TY COlVIMISSIONERS TO PERFORM 
A LEGISLATIVE AND DISCRETIONARY ACT. 
The order of the trial court, directing the appellant 
board to adopt an amendment re-zoning the land in 
question sounds in the nature of a writ of mandate 
(R-30). Although the historical pleadings for a writ of 
mandamus have been abolished by the Utah rules of 
civil procedure, 65B (a) the methods of obtaining the 
same type of relief as was formerly given by the 'vrit 
is now possible under present day pleadings as defined 
by the Utah rules. 
Rule 65 B (b) (3) of the l-tah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, provides that relief 'viii be granted: 
"'Vhere the relief sought is to compel any 
. . . board or person to perform an act which 
the la'v specifically enjoins as a duty resulting 
from an office, trust or station." 
The jurisdiction of the trial court to issue this 
decree 1nust be founded upon a sho,,~ing by respondent 
the respondent has a clear legal right to have the area 
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in question re-zoned, and that there has been a violation 
of a legal duty resting upon the appellant board to 
adopt the proposed ordinance. \Vithout this sho,ving, 
tlH~ reuH\d~· sought 1nust be \\·ithheld, and granting the 
retnPd~r \\·ithout this showing constitutes error. 
In the case of State ex rel Bishop v. ~loorehouse, 
:;s l r tah :z:~4, 11:2 P. 1G9, 171, the l; tah Supre1ne Court, 
defining in \vhat instances n1andamus will issue, said: 
H ~. • • To warrant the court, in granting a 
\\·rit against a public officer, suc-h a state of facts 
n1u~t be presented as to show that the relator has 
a clear right to the perfor1nance of the thing de-
manded, and that a corresponding duty rests upon 
the officer to perform that particular thing. And 
\vhen substantial doubt exists as to the duty 
whose perfor1nance it is sought to coerce, or as 
to the right or power of the officer to perform 
such duty, the relief \Vill be \Vithheld.' vVhere there 
is a discretion vested in the officer, the rule gen-
erally applied is stated h~· the author in section 
-!1 of l\Ierrill, on l\Iandan1us, in the following 
\\·orcl::-;: ~But the action of an officer in a Inat-
ter \\·hich calls for the exercise of his discretion or 
judg1nent will not be reviewed hy the \vrit of Inan-
dainus unless he has been guilty of u clear and 
\vilful disregard of his duty, or such action is 
sho"\\rn to be extremely \vrong or flagrantly im-
proper and unjust, so that the decision can only 
be explained as the result of caprice, passion or 
partiality.' In speaking of the general rule \\·hich 
is ordinarily applied hy the courts in passing on 
the question whether the \\·ri t should be granted 
or \vithheld, Wood on 1\Iandamu~, etc., at page 51 
of his \vork, says: ~And generally it may be said 
that a mandamus \\'ill not be issued unless the 
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duty it is sought to enforce is a legal duty, clear 
and free from doubt, and the right of the party 
seeking redress through this summary remedy is 
equally clear.' " (Page 171) 
The same rule should apply under tl1e ne"\\r Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, since the re1nedy and relief 
sought is the same, although the technical titles for 
the relief have been abolished. 
The appellant board, acting within its discretion, 
by a two to on vote refuse·d to adopt the proposed amend-
ment. (R-17) For the court now to order the board 
to adopt legislation it has once refused is beyond the 
po,ver of the court. Appellant submits that it is a funda-
mental proposition of government that the court may 
not legislate. The judicial process is to interpret the 
la,v, not to make the law. (See Conley, State's attorney, 
ex rei. Rowell v. Boyle et al., 115 ·Conn. 406, 162 A. 26.) 
Lacking the power to issue such an order the court 
IS lacking in jurisdiction and thus erred in issuing its 
decree. 
POINT II. 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, IN Al\iEND-
ING OR REFUSING TO AMEND ITS ORDINANCES, ACTS 
IN A LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY AND AS SUCH THE MO-
TIVES PROMPTING ITS ACTION CANNOT BE INQUIRED 
IN'TO. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, THEREFORE, IN HAV-
ING MAKE FINDINGS UPON SAID MOTIVES AND BASING 
ITS DECISION THEREON. 
lJtah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 17, ·Chapter 27, Sec-
tion 1, provides that the county con11nissioners of each 
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county a l'l' authorized and elnpo,,·ered to zone all or 
any part of the unincorporat e<l terri toy of said county. 
tTtah Code ..:\nnotated, 1953, Title 17, Chapter '27, See-
tion 1-t, authorizes the ~unend1nent of said zoning ordi-
nanc-es and provides procedures to be followed to 
aeeo1nplish said amendrnents. Its language is as follows: 
·~The board of county comrnissioners may 
fron1 ti1ne to ti1ne amend the number, shape, 
boundaries or area of any district or districts, 
or any regulation of or \vithin such district or 
districts, or any other provisions of the zoning 
resolution, but any such arnendrnent shall not 
be n1ade or becorne effective unles:-5 the san1e 
shall have been proposed h~r or be first subrnitted 
for the approval, disapproval or suggestions of 
the county planning comn1ission; and if disap-
proved by such commission \vithin thirty days 
after such subrnission, such amendrnent, to be-
come effective, shall receive the favorable vote 
of not less than a majorit~· of the entire mern-
bership of the board of county connnissioners. 
Before finally adopting any such amendment, the 
board of county com1nissioners shall hold a pub-
lic hearing thereon, at least thirty day's notice 
of the time and place of \Yhich shall be given hy 
at least one publication in a ne\vspaper of general 
circulation in the county." 
'rhat the adoption and arnend1nent of zoning ordinances 
is a legislative function \vas decided by this court in 
the case of Waltoll v. Tracy Loan and Trnst Co., et al., 
97 l;tah 2-±9, 92 Pac. :2nd, 72-l-, 726, \vherein it said, (after 
pointing out that the terms of the statutes then1selves 
described the po"rer to zone as a legislative function) 
as follows: 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Independent of the statutory provisions re-
ferred to above, no one could doubt that the exer-
cise of the zoning po\\rer is definitely a legislative 
function and activity." 
That zoning is a legislative function was not decided 
but simply assumed in the later cases of Phi Kappa Iota 
Fraternity v. Salt Lake Cvty, et al., 116 litah 536, 212 
Pac. 2nd 177, and Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
123 Utah 107, 255 Pac. 2nd, 723. 
Being a legislative and therefore discretionary func-
tion, the motives of the Salt Lake ·County Commission 
should not have been inquired into according to the view 
of this court expressed in the case of City of Ogden v. 
Crossman, 17 Utah, 66, 53 Pac. 985, 988, wherein the val-
idity of an act of the Ogden City council was involved, 
this court said : 
"It is apparent that the ordinance in ques-
tion 'vas passed by virtue of the express power 
and authority of the state as authorized by the 
constitution. Under such circumstances it "~as not 
competent to prove the unreasonableness of an 
ordinance by virtue of the conclusion of "~itnesses. 
The regulation of the n1atter "\vas left by law to 
the discretion of the city council and not to the 
defendants. By granting the power the legislature 
imposd upon the city council the discretion to 
determine just how far they could go "ithin the 
limits imposed and there is every presu1nption 
that the council "\vere actuated by pure 1notives and 
that they \\rere so fruniliar "~i th the nlischief 
sought to be guarded against and the needs of 
the city as to be the best judges of the necessities 
for the enactn1ent of the ordinance and the extent 
10 
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to whieh it was advisable or necessary to exercise 
the po,ver granted. In such cases the council and 
not the court is the proper repository of this 
public trust; and it should be a plain case to 
justify the court in interfering with the determi-
nation of the council or questioning their motives 
in enacting the ordinance. Under the circunl-
stances, the court ought not to interfere on the 
ground that the ordinance \Yas unreasonable, but 
is restricted to the constitutionality of the act 
granting the power. The ordinance itself proves 
the exigency which existed which required its 
enactment." 
That this is the general and almost unanimous atti-
tude of the courts in this country is indicated in an 
annotation entitled ",r alidity of .nrunicipal Ordinances 
as .A_ffected by ~lotives of Members of Council which 
Adopted It," 32 ALR 1517. The author of that anno-
tation begins with the following statement: 
uit is generally held that the motive of the 
legislative body of a municipal corporation, in 
adopting an ordinance, is not the subject of ju-
dicial inquiry." 
Then follo,ving are citations quoting that rule fro1n 
1nost jurisdctions in this country, including lTtah. 
The finding of the trial court as expressed in para-
graph 11 of its "Findings of Fact" ,,~as clearly an in-
vasion by the trial court into the motives of the County 
Commission. Said finding is as follows: 
"11. The action of the board of county com-
missioners of Salt Lake County in denying said 
zoning amendment was unreasonable, arbitrary 
11 
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and an abuse of sound executive and adnlinistra-
tive discretion in the follo\ving particulars: (a) 
the denial was based \vholly upon the premise that 
such a denial would protect an economic advant-
age already obtained by owners of other land 
zoned commercially in the general n1arketing area 
in 'vhich the land in question is located; (b) 
The planning and zoning commission, after in-
vestigation, determined the amendment \\Tas nec-
essary to best serve the population of the area 
in question; (c) At the public hearing in the 
matter no evidence of any kind \Yas presented 
in opposition to the proposed amendment except 
the testimony and statements of competing, yet 
remote com1nercial users who opposed the zoning 
amendment in order to protect their own eco-
nomic advantage acquired by prior commercial 
zoning." (R-29, 30) 
The assu1nption by the trial court that the denial 
of the comn1ission 'vas based \vholly upon any one pren1-
ise, and that said pren1ise 'vas one on \Yhich they \vere 
not justified in acting demonstrates the hazards of at-
ternpting to ascribe motives to the action of legislative 
bodies. It is subrnitted that no one kno\\Ts and no one 
can kno\v on \vhat basis the county co1nn1ission made 
their decision. 
The conclusion of the lo·w·er court that the amend-
ment requested h~T plaintiffs should have been granted, 
having been based largely on the above conclusion con-
cerning the n1otives of the com1nission, is therefore in 
error and should be reversed. 
12 
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POINT III. 
THE DENIAL BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMIS-
SIONERS TO ADOPT THE ZONING AMENDMENT WAS 
NOT AN ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE ACT, NOR 
WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THERE IS NO EVI-
DENCE DENYING THE REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE 
POLICE POWER ON THE PART OF THE COUNTY COJ_\Jl-
MISSIONERS. 
The question of zoning authority and the authorized 
use of the police power by the governing municipal 
bodies, arose in Utah in the case of Marshall v. Salt 
Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 Pac. 2nd, 704. In that 
case Salt Lake City appealed fro1n a decision of the 
District Court which ruled that the Mayor and City 
council had acted arbitrarily in the enforcement of its 
zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court which had held against the city. Part of the 
language in that case is as follows: (141 Pac. 2nd 709, 
710) 
"The wisdo1n of the plan, the necessity for 
zoning, the nu1nber and nature of the districts 
to be created, the boundaries thereof, and the 
uses therein permitted, are rnatters which lie in 
the discretion of the governing body of the city. 
Unless the action of such body is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends 
some provision of the constitution or statute, 
the court n1ust uphold it, if within the grant of 
power to the municipality." 
The court cites four cases in support of this point 
of law. The case states further: 
It is primarily the duty of the city to 1nake 
the classifications. If a classification is reasonably 
13 
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doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be 
substituted for the judgment of the city," and 
further, "As to what restrictions and limtations 
should be i1nposed upon property, and what uses 
thereof should be per1ni tted, has been by the 
legislature, committed to the judgment and dis-
cretion of the governing body of the city. As long 
as that body stays within the grant, and pur-
poses fixed by the legislature, the courts 'vill 
not gainsay (its) judgment. 
In the case of Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt 
Lake City 116 lTtah 536, 212 Pac. 2d 177, the fraternity 
sought to determine the constitutionality of a City Ordi-
nance confining the use of premises in a restricted 
residential area, for a fraternity or a sorority, to an 
area not more than 600 feet fro1n the institution to 
which the fraternity or sorority is an incident. The 
court advanced several legal principals in the determina-
tion of the decision in that case 'vhich are in point and 
support the contentions of Salt Lake County even though 
they were construing the validity of an ordinance rather 
than the refusal to amend. The following principles of 
law were announced: 
Exercise of statutory discretionary po"\\rer 
to district and zone cities for various purposes 
that are to the public interest ,,~in not be inter-
fered "\vith by tl1e courts unless the discretion is 
abused; and further The selection of one Ineth-
od of solving the zoning pro blen1 in preference 
to another is entirety "Ti thin the discretion of 
the rit~T connnission and does not, in and of it-
self, evidence an abuse of discretion. 
The 1nost recent cases in point in lTtah appears to 
14 
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be Dou'sc r .• ~1alt Lake ('ity, et al, 123, tTtah 107, 255 
Pac. :2d 7:2:~, deeided in April of 1953. This was a case 
brought to declare a zoning ordinance of Salt Lake 
City unconstitutional as it applied to the lots involved. 
Plaintiff's cornplaint alleged that his land was unsuit-
able for residential property; that it 'vas located in a 
potential industrial or commercial zone; that the zoning 
ordinance as applied to his property, served no bene-
ficial use, and in no manner promoted the health, safety, 
1norals or general welfare of the community, that the 
value of his property would be greatly enhanced if it 
could be used for industrial purposes; and that under 
these circumstances the zoning ordinance was so oppres-
ive as to be confiscatory and unlawful. The request to 
re-zone plaintiff's land was denied by Salt Lake City. 
Accordingly, a consistency was established on the Utah 
application of the Doctrine of Judicial Revew, with the 
~Iarshall case, the Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity case and 
the ,,~alton case with the advancemnt of the following 
principles : 
The wisdom of a plan, necessity, number, 
nature, and boundaries of zoning districts are 
matters which lie in the discretion of City author-
ities. 
Only if action of eit~T authorities in creating 
zoning districts is confiscatory·, or arbitrarily may 
court set aside their action. 
Complaint containing allegations that land-
owner's property might have been n1ore profit-
ably used for commercial than for residential 
purposes, that his property had become unsuit-
15 
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able for residential purposes and that much of 
property in other blocks in neighborhood was 
zoned for commercial purposes did not show 
confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary action 
of city authorities ·w-hich \vould justify· judicial 
alteration of zoned boundaries. 
The character of zoning district as a whole 
must be kept in mind determining whether health, 
safety, n1orals or general ,,~elfare of district and 
hence community would be promoted by permit-
ting encroachment into residential area of com-
mercial or industrial establishments. 
At the hearing held in the Salt Lake County ,Com-
mission chambers on the 4th day of N ove1nber, 1959, 
for the purpose of having the public express their views 
to the commission there appeared some fifteen persons 
supporting the proposed change and some fourteen per-
sons objecting to the proposed change. The ordinances 
of Salt Lake ·County enacted pursuant to Title 17, Chap-
ter 27, Paragraph 1±, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vide for a public hearing prior to a zoning amendment. 
Such hearings is for the purpose of having the view·s 
of the public aired before the Conunission in order to 
give them the benefit of thinking of persons \Yho are 
interested in the problen1. The nurnber of persons \vho 
appear are in no \\~ay indicative of a cross section of 
the public for or against the zoning arnendrnent, nor 
is it rnaterial. The board is en1pO\Yered to make its 
decision regardless of the reeorrunenda tions of the Dis-
trict Zoning Connnittee, the Planning Comrnission, or 
the views of the rnernbers of the public \vho attend the 
hearing, provided their decision is not in conflict "~ith 
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the best intPrests of the health, safPty, In orals and 
general welfare of the public. 
'rhe evidence introduced at the hearing \vas clearly 
conflicting. There is no sho\ving that those \vho opposed 
the proposed zoning changes \vere interested directly 
or indirectly in co1npetitive business ventures, nor would 
that be material in a determination of this case. The 
only co1npetent evidence \vhich touches upon the reason-
ableness of commission action is that dealing with the 
traffic problem. It was stated that a commercial area 
at the intersection of 56th South and 13th East would 
create a bottleneck which should not exist. The com-
Inercial area already established on 9th East and on 
Hyland Drive will have the effect of deterring north-
south traffie, and the proposed 13th East expressway 
should be left open to facilitate said flo\v of traffic 
\\Tithout interference. (Testimony of Mrs. Rippe, page 
60) There is no evidenee denying the reasonable exercise 
of the police power on the part of the county coin-
Inission. The court did not have before it any facts 
indicating the views of the commissioners and \vas coin-
pletely in the dark as to what reasoning processes were 
used in order to arrive at the decision reached. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing Reasons, appellant maintains 
that the trial court erred in overruling the County Com-
mission and in ordering them to an1end the Zoning 
Ordinances of Salt Lake County. Appellant respectfully 
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requests that this court reverse the summary judgment 
of District Court and allow this n1atter to be tried on 
the merits. 
GRO\TER A. GILES 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
LOUIS ni. HAYNIE, and 
GERALD E. NIELSON, 
Deputies, Civil Division 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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